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ABSTRACT
This article examines the testamentary rescue provisions contained in the
statutes governing wills in Manitoba, British Columbia and South Africa, as
well as some of the jurisprudence on the interpretation and application of
these provisions. The article thus provides an instructive legal comparative
analysis of how formally irregular wills are judicially rescued and, therefore,
how testamentary formalism is tempered to ensure that testamentary
intentions embodied in informal documents are effectuated in the three
jurisdictions under discussion. The article also evaluates (in broad terms) the
efficacy of Manitoba’s, British Columbia’s and South Africa’s respective
testamentary rescue dispensations, and attends to some lessons and possible
solutions to challenges arising from these jurisdictions’ engagement with
testamentary rescue.
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Introduction
The statutes governing wills in many Commonwealth member states are his-
torically rooted in two English sources, namely the Statute of Frauds 1677 (29
Car 2 c 3) and the Wills Act 1837 (7 Will 4 & 1 Vict c 26). This is especially true of,
amongst others, Australia,1 Canada (with the exception of Québec)2 and New
Zealand,3 each of which derive their laws pertaining to wills directly from
English law. The will forms prescribed by the wills statutes in the aforemen-
tioned jurisdictions thus correspond greatly to the will form laid down in
the 1837 Act, which also impacted formal aspects of testamentary succession
© 2020 Faculty of Law, Oxford University
CONTACT Francois du Toit fdutoit@uwc.ac.za
1Nicola Peart, ‘Testamentary Formalities in Australia and New Zealand’ in Kenneth GC Reid, Marius J de
Waal and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Comparative Succession Law: Testamentary Formalities (Oxford
University Press 2011) 333.
2Thomas G Feeney, The Canadian Law of Wills: Probate (3rd edn, Butterworths 1987) 82.
3Peart (n 1) 333–34.
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in some Commonwealth member states (or territories within such member
states) where the laws of wills are founded on civil law tenets. For example,
South Africa (with Roman-Dutch law as its civilian common law4) currently
recognises only one will form, namely the statutory (underhand) will that is
based on the will form prescribed by the 1837 Act.5 Similarly, the Civil Code
of Québec (inspired by the French civil law contained in the Napoleonic
Code6) acknowledges a number of will forms, one of which is aptly described
as the ‘will following the form derived from the laws of England’.7 All the afore-
mentioned will forms thus draw on the formality prescripts of the 1837 Act.
The jurisdictions mentioned above generally require a combination of
writing, signature, the presence of witnesses and attestation for the validity
of wills (or, in the case of Québec, for the execution of the specific will form
derived from English law known as ‘the will made in the presence of wit-
nesses’8). Moreover, these jurisdictions have historically demanded strict com-
pliance with testamentary formalities to ensure that wills are validly executed.
Any deviation from these formalities, no matter how obscure or ostensibly
innocuous, voids the affected will absolutely and irreparably.9 Testamentary
formalities perform four core functions that explain this historical insistence
on wills’ formal regularity. Legal scholars (particularly American scholars)
have canvassed these functions on numerous occasions and their endeavours
need not be repeated here.10 For the purposes of this article, the following
brief description and explanation of the four functions will suffice:
. the evidentiary function: a formally regular will provides evidence of the
testator’s volition regarding the distribution of his or her property after
death;
. the protective function: a will’s formal regularity ensures that its contents
and execution are the products of the testator’s free and unfettered choice;
4Eduard Fagan, ‘Roman-Dutch Law in its South African Historical Context’ in Reinhard Zimmermann and
Daniel Visser (eds), Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (Clarendon Press 1996) 33–
64.
5Marius J de Waal, ‘Testamentary Formalities in South Africa’ in Reid, de Waal and Zimmermann (n 1), 384–
85.
6E Fabre-Surveyer, ‘The Civil Law in Québec and Louisiana’ (1939) 1 Louisiana Law Review 649, 657.
7Tim Hewson, ‘Why We Don’t Support Québec Wills’ (The Canadian Legal Wills Blog, 29 September 2014)
<www.legalwills.ca/blog/quebec-wills/> accessed 7 August 2019.
8Civil Code of Québec SQ 1991 c 64, art 727.
9The South African wills statute (Wills Act 7 of 1953 (WA 1953)) provides a case in point. WA 1953, s 2(1)(a)
stipulates that ‘no will executed on or after the first day of January, 1954 [the Act’s commencement
date], shall be valid unless… ’, and thereafter follows the formalities for the execution of a valid will.
The statutory directive is thus clear: compliance with the prescribed formalities is an absolute require-
ment for the formal validity of South African wills.
10See, eg, John H Langbein, ‘Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act’ (1975) 88(3) Harvard Law Review
489, 492–98; Leigh A Shipp, ‘Equitable Remedies for Nonconforming Wills: New Choices for Probate
Courts in the United States’ (2005) 79 Tulane Law Review 723, 725; George Holmes, ‘Testamentary Form-
alism in Louisiana: Curing Notarial Will Defects Through a Likelihood-of-Fraud Analysis’ (2014) 75 Louisi-
ana Law Review 511, 516–17.
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. the cautionary function: compliance with testamentary formalities estab-
lishes that the testator comprehends the significance of the act of will-
making; and
. the channelling function: standardised will forms occasion the contents of
most wills to correspond, thereby increasing administrative efficacy and
certainty for testators when they draft their wills.
Steadfast adherence to testamentary formalism – notwithstanding the
aforementioned functional importance of strict compliance with testamentary
formalities – is nevertheless problematic when a document contains a
person’s intentions regarding the devolution of his or her property after
death, but the document is formally irregular and is thus not a valid will
capable of effectuating that person’s post mortem dispositive plan. This
problem arises because statutory insistence on strict compliance with testa-
mentary formalities can be at odds with one of the cornerstones of the law
of wills, namely protecting and giving effect to a testator’s intentions.11 Insist-
ing on strict compliance at the expense of effectuating a testator’s dispositive
plan therefore amounts to an apparent prioritisation of form over substance in
the law of succession.12 It is consequently unsurprising that many legal
systems, including those of some Commonwealth member states, have devel-
oped and implemented mechanisms to combat the adverse effects that tes-
tamentary formalism can have on testamentary intent. One such mechanism
is the statutory conferral of a power that permits a court to condone, cure and/
or dispense with formal irregularities in wills, thereby ensuring that technical
defects in the execution of wills do not frustrate testators’ intentions regard-
ing the devolution of their property after death. This article employs the term
‘testamentary rescue’ to describe this practice.
Australia, Canada and South Africa are three Commonwealth member
states wherein wills statutes (including, where applicable, wills statutes of
states and territories within those member states) bestow such powers on
courts to rescue formally irregular wills. However, the statutory provisions
that confer these powers, although sharing the objective of safeguarding tes-
tators’ intentions despite non-compliance with testamentary formalities, are
invariably formulated differently; lay down dissimilar requirements for the
exercise of said powers; and are interpreted and applied by the courts in a
manner which yields fluctuating and at times troubling outcomes. A compara-
tive analysis of these provisions and the judicial exercise of the powers they
confer therefore yields valuable insights into different jurisdictions’ engage-
ment with the challenges posed by testamentary formalism. Additionally,
and arguably more importantly, such a comparative analysis provides
11Holmes (n 10) 518.
12Mark Glover, ‘Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution’ (2014) 88 St John’s Law Review 597, 604.
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instructive direction to jurisdictions looking to incorporate similar provisions
in their wills statutes.
This article undertakes a comparative analysis of testamentary rescue in
Canada and South Africa.13 It does so by considering the rescue provisions
in the wills statutes of two Canadian jurisdictions – namely, Manitoba and
British Columbia14 – and South Africa. The article focusses, insofar as its
engagement with Canadian law is concerned, only on Manitoba and British
Columbia not merely for reasons of brevity and efficacy, but also because
the current Manitoban rescue provision has been in operation for about as
long as its South African counterpart, whereas the British Columbian rescue
provision is a more recent addition to that jurisdiction’s law of wills. These
timelines permit an instructive comparison of the evolving judicial interpret-
ations and applications of rescue provisions over relatively long periods (in the
cases of Manitoba and South Africa), in addition to the courts’ engagement
with a comparatively novel rescue provision (in the case of British Columbia).
Testamentary formalities and the rescue provisions of wills
statutes in Manitoba, British Columbia and South Africa
Testamentary formalities for the formal (non-holograph) will in Manitoba and
British Columbia as well as the statutory will in South Africa, in accordance
with these jurisdictions’ adherence to the will form laid down in the 1837
Act, focus on: the signing of a will by the testator or someone on the testator’s
behalf;15 the making or acknowledging of this signature in the presence of
two or more witnesses who are simultaneously present;16 and the subsequent
attestation and signing of the will by these witnesses.17 All three wills statutes
direct that a will is formally valid only upon compliance with all the aforemen-
tioned formalities.18 In addition, the Manitoban and British Columbian sta-
tutes expressly require that a will must be in writing.19 The South African
statute contains no comparable express directive, but a writing requirement
is nevertheless inferred on the basis that compliance with the statute’s pre-
scribed formalities is possible only in respect of written documents.20
13See François du Toit, ‘Testamentary Rescue: An Analysis of the Intention Requirement in Australia and
South Africa’ (2014) 23 Australian Property Law Journal 56 for a legal comparative consideration of Aus-
tralian courts’ ‘dispensing power’ and South African courts’ ‘condonation power’ regarding formal irre-
gularities in wills.
14Other Canadian jurisdictions that have incorporated rescue provisions in their wills statutes include
Alberta, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Québec and Saskatchewan.
15The Wills Act CCSM (RSM 1988) c W150 (Manitoba) (TWA 1988), s 4(a) and 7(1); Wills, Estates and Suc-
cession Act SBC 2009 c 13 (British Columbia) (WESA 2009), s 37(1)(b); WA 1953, s 2(1)(a)(i).
16TWA 1988, s 4(b); WESA 2009, s 37(1)(b); WA 1953, s 2(1)(a)(ii).
17TWA 1988, s 4(c); WESA 2009, s 37(1)(c); WA 1953, s 2(1)(a)(iii).
18TWA 1988, s 4; WESA 2009, s 37(1); WA 1953, s 2(1)(a).
19TWA 1988, s 3; WESA 2009, s 37(1)(a).
20MJ de Waal and MC Schoeman-Malan, Law of Succession (5th edn, Juta 2015) 55–56.
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Section 23 of the Manitoban statute grants the ‘dispensation power’, pur-
suant to the terms of which a court can undertake testamentary rescue. It has
been operational in its current form since 199521 and provides:
Dispensation power
Where, upon application, if the court is satisfied that a document or any
writing on a document embodies
(a) the testamentary intentions of a deceased; or
(b) the intention of a deceased to revoke, alter or revive a will of the
deceased or the testamentary intentions of the deceased embodied in
a document other than a will;
the court may, notwithstanding that the document or writing was not
executed in compliance with any or all of the formal requirements
imposed by this Act, order that the document or writing, as the case
may be, be fully effective as though it had been executed in compliance
with all the formal requirements imposed by this Act as the will of the
deceased or as the revocation, alteration or revival of the will of the
deceased or of the testamentary intention embodied in that other docu-
ment, as the case may be.
Section 58 of the British Columbian statute bestows a ‘curative power’
through which a court can, on application, undertake testamentary rescue.
This provision has been in operation since 201422 and provides:
Court order curing deficiencies
(1) In this section, ‘record’ includes data that
(a) is recorded or stored electronically,
(b) can be read by a person, and
(c) is capable of reproduction in visible form.
(2) On application, the court may make an order under subsection (3) if the
court determines that a record, document or writing or marking on a
will or document represents
(a) the testamentary intentions of a deceased person,
(b) the intention of a deceased person to revoke, alter or revive a will or
testamentary disposition of the deceased person, or
(c) the intention of a deceased person to revoke, alter or revive a testa-
mentary disposition contained in a document other than a will.
(3) Even though the making, revocation, alteration or revival of a will does not
comply with this Act, the court may, as the circumstances require, order
21The original form of section 23 of TWA 1988 was amended by section 2 of The Wills Amendments Act SM
1995 c 12, which came into force on 3 November 1995.
22WESA 2009 was assented to on 29 October 2009 but did not come into force until 31 March 2014.
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that a record, or document, or writing or marking on a will or document
be fully effective as though it had been made
(a) as the will or part of the will of the deceased person,
(b) as a revocation, alteration or revival of the will of the deceased
person, or
(c) as the testamentary intention of the deceased person.
(4) If an alteration to a will makes a word or provision illegible and the court is
satisfied that the alteration was not made in accordance with this Act, the
court may reinstate the original word or provision if there is evidence to
establish what the original word or provision was.
Section 2(3) of the South African statute affords the ‘condonation power’
through which a court can undertake testamentary rescue. This provision
came into force in 199223 and provides:
Formalities required in the execution of a will
(3) If a court is satisfied that a document or the amendment of a document
drafted or executed by a person who has died since the drafting or execution
thereof, was intended to be his will or an amendment of his will, the court
shall order the Master to accept that document, or that document as
amended, for the purposes of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act
66 of 1965), as a will, although it does not comply with all the formalities
for the execution or amendment of wills referred to in subsection (1).24
Before attending to a number of substantive matters regarding testamen-
tary rescue pursuant to the abovementioned provisions, the following four
preliminary points deserve mention:
. the three jurisdictions employ different terminology when referencing the
power to rescue formally irregular wills – the Manitoban statute utilises ‘dis-
pensation power’ and Manitoba courts generally abide by this term25 or its
derivative ‘dispensing power’;26 courts in British Columbia prefer ‘curative
power’;27 whereas South African courts favour ‘power to condone’;28
. the rescue provisions’ ambits, as stated in the respective statutes, vary – in
Manitoba and British Columbia, the power of testamentary rescue
23The original form of WA 1953 commenced on 1 January 1954 but section 2(3) did not form part of the
statute until the Law of Succession Amendment Act 43 of 1992 entered into force on 1 October 1992.
24WA 1953, s 2(1)(a) contains the execution formalities and s 2(1)(b) contains the amendment formalities in
respect of South African wills.
25See, eg, George v Daily (1997) 115 Man R (2d) 27 (Manitoba Court of Appeal) [2].
26See, eg, Weselowski v Weselowski 2003 MBQB 191 (Court of Queen’s Bench of Manitoba) [16].
27See, eg, Estate Beck (Re) 2015 BCSC 676 (Supreme Court of British Columbia) [16].
28See, eg, Giles v Henriques 2008 (4) SA 558 (C) (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division High Court (now
forming part of the Western Cape Division of the High Court of South Africa (HCSA-WC))) [39].
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encompasses the execution, alteration, revocation and revival of wills,
whereas South Africa permits the judicial condonation of irregularities in
the execution and amendment of wills only;29
. the three rescue provisions share the objective of having a rescued docu-
ment regulate the devolution of the deceased’s property after death by
assimilating that document into the legal processes that govern such devo-
lution – in Manitoba and British Columbia, a rescued document will be
admitted to probate,30 and section 2(3) of the South African statute instructs
the Master of the High Court to accept the rescued document for purposes
of the administration of the deceased’s estate (which is South African law’s
functional equivalent of admitting a will to probate); and
. the rescue provisions’ recourse to discretion (or lack thereof) – Manitoba’s
and British Columbia’s rescue provisions are cast in permissive terms
insofar as the use of the word ‘may’ in these provisions imbues courts in
these jurisdictions with a discretion regarding whether or not to grant an
application for testamentary rescue;31 the South African provision, on the
other hand, is formulated peremptorily insofar as the use of the word
‘shall’ in this provision compels a court, upon the requirements for testa-
mentary rescue having been met, to issue a condonation order to the
Master.32
The requirements for testamentary rescue in Manitoba, British
Columbia and South Africa
Section 23 of the Manitoban statute states, at least on the face of it, only a
single requirement to be satisfied in order for a court to exercise the
29A formally irregular document that contains a revocatory clause will, if it is condoned in terms of the WA
1953’s rescue provision, of course revoke the deceased’s existing will(s): De Waal and Schoeman-Malan
(n 20) 91. WA 1953, s 2A moreover empowers a court to condone informal acts of revocation that do not
occasion revocation in terms of the common law. WA 1953 therefore contains mechanisms that facilitate
testamentary rescue regarding the revocation of wills and is thus aligned, at least to an extent, with its
counterparts from Manitoba and British Columbia in this regard. It appears unlikely that a South African
court will condone a formally irregular document that purports to revive a revoked will because such a
reviving document is not intended as a will or an amendment of a will as contemplated in WA 1953, s 2
(3). In light of the fact that the operational ambits of the three statutes’ rescue provisions are varied, this
article focusses principally on the rescue of documents that are invalid for want of compliance with tes-
tamentary execution formalities.
30See, eg, Timm v Rudolph 2016 MBQB 123 [1] (regarding TWA 1988, s 23) and Estate Mace (Re) 2018 BCSC
1284 [35] (regarding WESA 2009, s 58).
31See, eg, Weselowski (n 26) [27] (where Schulman J remarked that TWA 1988, s 23 ‘vests a discretion in
[the MBQB] as to whether and in what circumstances to grant the application’) and Estate of Young 2015
BCSC 182, [17] (where Dickson J acknowledged that WESA 2009, s 58 ‘confers a discretion on the [BCSC]
to relieve against the consequences of non-compliance with testamentary formalities… ’).
32See, eg, Harlow v Becker 1998 (4) SA 639 (D) (Durban and Coast Local Division High Court (now forming
part of the KwaZulu-Natal Division of the High Court of South Africa (HCSA-KZN))) 642I (where Thirion J
stated that, once a court is satisfied that the requirements of WA 1953, s 2(3) have been met, ‘the Court
[has] no discretion in the matter but [is] obliged to order the Master to accept the document as a will
… ’).
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dispensation power, namely that the document in question must embody the
deceased’s testamentary intentions – the ‘testamentary intentions require-
ment’. This is indeed how the Manitoba Court of Appeal ostensibly interpreted
section 23 in George v Daily33 – the leading Manitoban case on point –
wherein Philp JA (Scott CJM concurring) opined that section 23 demands of
a court to establish on a balance of probabilities that the document at issue
contains the deceased’s testamentary intentions.34 ‘Testamentary intentions’
in this context mean, according to Philp JA, that the deceased must have
evinced his or her animus testandi as a ‘deliberate or fixed and final expression
of intention as to the disposal of his/her property on death.’35 Dewar J inter-
preted this statement in Timm v Rudolph36 to mean that the deceased must
have contemplated the document at issue as a testamentary document to
be admitted to probate when the time came, and that the deceased must
thus not have regarded it simply as a document that disclosed his or her dis-
tributive wishes at the time.37 Dewar J opined further that, if the court is
satisfied that the document indeed embodies the deceased’s testamentary
intentions and the application that it be given full legal effect is unopposed,
no practical hindrance precludes a judge from exercising the dispensation
power in terms of section 23.38
Section 23’s testamentary intentions requirement can thus be designated
as its core requirement. It is, however, important to note that, in Weselowski v
Weselowski,39 the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench dismissed an application
brought under section 23 because Schulman J reasoned (amongst other
things) that the document brought before the court in that case was not ‘a
credible document’.40 This reasoning suggests that the judicial exercise of
the dispensation power is also dependent on a court being satisfied regarding
the authenticity of the document at issue – the ‘authenticity requirement’. In
fact, in light of the reasoning inWeselowski, it is arguable that the authenticity
requirement is the threshold requirement that must be satisfied even before a
court proceeds to an inquiry regarding whether or not the testamentary inten-
tions requirement has been met.
The British Columbian statute corresponds with its Manitoban counterpart
insofar as the core requirement for the judicial exercise of the curative power
granted by section 58 is concerned. Dickson J therefore reasoned in Estate of
Young41 that ‘[t]he court must be satisfied that a document represents the
33George (n 25).
34ibid [20], [61]. See also McNeil v Snidor Estate 2008 MBQB 187, [19].
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testamentary intentions of the deceased before granting an order that it is
fully effective as a will pursuant to s 58(3)… ’.42 Dickson J moreover empha-
sised that section 58, and thus (correspondingly) section 23 of the Manitoban
statute, does not specify any execution requirements or any other formal
requirements in order for a court to bestow full legal effectiveness on such
a testamentary document.43
Dickson J’s analysis of the jurisprudence in relation to section 23 of the
Manitoban statute, undertaken to inform her Ladyship’s interpretation and
application of section 58 of the British Columbian statute, yielded an
outcome that confirms the abovementioned dual-requirement approach in
respect of the Manitoban provision – a dual-requirement equally applicable
under British Columbian law. In this connection, Dickson J reasoned:
[A] determination of whether to exercise the court’s curative power with respect
to a non-compliant document is inevitably and intensely fact-sensitive. Two
principal issues for consideration emerge from the post-1995 Manitoba auth-
orities. The first is an obvious threshold-issue: is the document authentic? The
second, and core, issue is whether the non-compliant document represents
the deceased’s testamentary intentions.44
Conversely, the requirements for testamentary rescue in accordance with
the terms of section 2(3) of the South African statute are more extensive
when compared to those of its two Canadian counterparts. Specifically, the
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa ruled in Van Wetten v Bosch45 that
exercise of the condonation power is subject to the court being satisfied
that the deceased drafted or executed the document at issue, in addition to
being satisfied that the deceased intended that document as his or her
will.46 Furthermore, in Van der Merwe v Master of the High Court,47 the very
same Court appeared to have regard to an additional requirement by refer-
ring to the ‘aura of authenticity’ of a document that was the subject of a con-
donation application.48 It is therefore arguable that section 2(3) sets the same
threshold requirement, namely the authenticity requirement, as well as the
same core requirement, namely the testamentary intentions requirement,
as its two Canadian counterparts. Moreover, the content of section 2(3)’s tes-
tamentary intentions requirement is substantially the same as that of the
equivalent Manitoban and British Columbian statutory provisions, given
that, in Van Wetten, the Court said that this requirement does not pertain to
what the document in question means, but rather to whether or not the
42ibid [19].
43ibid [21].
44ibid [34]. The Court of Appeal for British Columbia has since cited Dickson J’s analysis with apparent
approval: see Hadley Estate (Re) [2017] BCCA 311 [36].
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deceased intended it as his or her will.49 Section 2(3), however, interposes an
additional requirement between the authenticity requirement and the testa-
mentary intentions requirement, namely, as noted above, that the deceased
must have drafted or executed the document at issue. Neither section 23 of
the Manitoban statute nor section 58 of the British Columbian statute contains
a corresponding prescript. In Bekker v Naude,50 the same Court observed that
this ‘drafted-or-executed requirement’ serves to bolster compliance with the
authenticity requirement insofar as establishing that the deceased indeed
drafted or executed the document in question provides some guarantee
regarding that document’s credibility.51
Having said that, it must be noted that the drafted-or-executed requirement
prescribed by section 2(3) of the South African statute states the two apposite
actions in the alternative: the deceased must either have drafted or have exe-
cuted the document in question. ‘Executed’ in this regard ostensibly means
that the deceased must either have commenced with executing the document
but never have completed the execution process, or have appended his or her
signature at least once to the document.52 If a document was not executed in
the aforementioned manner, it can be condoned only if the deceased indeed
drafted it. In Bekker, the court ruled that the legislature contemplated personal
drafting in this regard – in other words, the deceased must have created the
document himself or herself by, for example: penning it in his or her handwrit-
ing; typing or computer-generating it himself or herself; or him or her dictating
it with the dictation being taken down verbatim by a scribe.53
The application of the rescue provisions in Manitoba, British
Columbia and South Africa: correlations and contrasts
This section of the article analyses the application of the rescue provisions in
the three jurisdictions under discussion with reference to specific document
types that have been considered by the courts in rescue cases in these juris-
dictions. This section therefore highlights various correlations and contrasts in
judicial engagement with testamentary rescue in the three jurisdictions.
Draft wills
The rescue provisions in all three jurisdictions generally preclude the rescue of
draft wills, whether such drafts were prepared by the prospective testator or
49Van Wetten (n 45) [16]. See also De Reszke v Czeslaw Maras [2005] ZASCA 137, [11]–[12].
50[2003] ZASCA 40.
51ibid [16].
52De Waal and Schoeman-Malan (n 20) 73. See also MC Wood-Bodley, ‘Did You Say “Asinine” Milord? –
Bekker v Naude 2003 5 SA 173 (SCA)’ (2004) 25 Obiter 222, 228–29.
53Bekker (n 50) [8], [20]. See also Grobler v Master of the High Court [2019] ZASCA 119, [14].
148 F. DU TOIT
by someone else on the prospective testator’s behalf. Courts in all three juris-
dictions have refused to give such drafts legal effect because these docu-
ments do not necessarily contain prospective testators’ complete and final
testamentary intentions. This strong stance against the rescue of draft wills
in all three jurisdictions is unsurprising in light of the fact that the testamen-
tary intentions requirement is the core requirement for testamentary rescue in
these jurisdictions. In Timm, the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench therefore
dismissed a section 23 application to rescue a draft will prepared by an arti-
cling student on the deceased’s instructions. The deceased passed away
without having seen, read, approved or signed the draft.54 Dewar J noted
that the draft contained clauses (albeit standard clauses that commonly
appear in wills) that were not discussed with the deceased at the time she
gave instructions for the drafting of her will.55 Dewar J reasoned that even
a draft will that contains standard clauses must be presented to a testator
for his or her consideration at the time of execution in order to ensure that
the document indeed embodies the testator’s intentions. Dewar J therefore
regarded it as ‘presumptuous for a legal regime to encourage the probate
of a will when the details of some gifts have never been discussed with the
client’.56
In Bailey Estate (Re),57 the Supreme Court of British Columbia likewise
refused a section 58 application to rescue a draft will prepared for the
deceased by her lawyer. The lawyer emailed the draft to her client (the
deceased), who acknowledged receipt thereof and indicated that she
would review it.58 The deceased however passed away approximately ten
months later without the draft having been executed.59 Hyslop J reasoned
that the deceased did not regard the draft’s preparation and anticipated
execution as a priority because (amongst other things): she gave various
instructions regarding the draft at different times; she missed meetings
with her lawyer regarding the draft; she did not read previous drafts of the
will; and she provided no indication to her lawyer as to whether or not she
was satisfied with the draft.60 Under these circumstances, according to
Hyslop J, ‘[t]here simply was no expression by [the deceased] whether the
… draft will was a final expression of her testamentary intentions.’61 Hyslop
J consequently refused to give legal effect to the draft will because, in her
Ladyship’s estimation, the deceased never adopted the draft, in particular
54Timm (n 30) [16]–[19].
55ibid [38].
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insofar as ‘[s]he never told anyone that she was satisfied with it and wanted to
sign it’.62
The former Supreme Court of South Africa delivered a corresponding
decision in Ramlal v Ramdhani’s Estate63 when it dismissed a section 2(3)
application for the condonation of a draft will. The deceased’s attorney pre-
pared the draft in accordance with the deceased’s directives, but the
deceased passed away without having seen or signed the draft will.64 Richings
AJ reasoned as follows:
I fail to see how, when a document as is referred to in the subsection has been
drafted, not by the would-be testator himself but on his instruction and he dies
before reading it and approving its contents, it can be said that he ‘intended’
that that particular document was to be his last will. Testators are notoriously
fickle, there always exists the possibility of their wishes changing in the interval
between the giving of instructions and the final approval of what has been
drafted. Every attorney knows that even where ordinary commercial agreements
are concerned, it is not unknown for alterations to be suggested and effected
while the document embodying the terms of the agreement is being read
through for the purposes of signature. How much more so, when the document
in question is intended to embody the client’s last wishes upon this earth.65
It must be noted that, at the time of the Ramlal decision, South African trial
judges were still divided on the issue of whether an unexecuted document
prepared for a deceased by another was capable of condonation. The
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa subsequently settled this issue in
Bekkerwhen it held that a document prepared by someone else is condonable
only if the deceased in fact executed it (as demanded by section 2(3)).66 In
Bekker’s aftermath, a case concerning a document similar to the one at
issue in Ramlal will therefore not turn on the testamentary intentions require-
ment, but rather on the drafted-or-executed requirement.
Instructions and application forms
Logic dictates that, if courts are loath to rescue draft wills in the three jurisdic-
tions under discussion, it can be assumed that these courts will regard the
rescue of instructions for the drafting of wills, as well as completed application
forms for the same purpose, with even greater reluctance. This assumption
rests on the rational deduction that, if draft wills prepared on prospective tes-
tators’ instructions do not meet the testamentary intentions requirement
62ibid [62]. See also Herod Estate (Re) 2017 BCSC 318.
632002 (2) SA 643 (N) (Natal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa (SCSA-N) (now
forming part of HCSA-KZN)).
64ibid 645C–H.
65ibid 647D–G (errors and emphasis in original). See also Henwick v The Master 1997 (2) SA 326 (C) (Cape of
Good Hope Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa (SCSA-C) (now forming part of
HCSA-WC)).
66De Waal and Schoeman-Malan (n 20) 73. See also Wood-Bodley (n 52) 228–29.
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prescribed by the rescue provisions in these jurisdictions, then written instruc-
tions and completed application forms, as documents that precede will draft-
ing, cannot possibly meet this requirement. This is indeed the general tenor of
case law on point in the three jurisdictions, but some decisions deviate cur-
iously from this norm.
For the sake of brevity, engagement with Canadian authority can be limited
to the seminal judgment in George,67 where the Manitoba Court of Appeal
allowed an appeal against an order of the Manitoba Court of Queen’s
Bench to give legal effect to written instructions for the drafting of a new
will given by the deceased to his accountant. Philp JA (Scott CJM concurring)
reasoned that no evidence was adduced to prove that the deceased intended
the letter containing the instructions to have dispositive effect or to operate
provisionally as a testamentary instrument until the drafting of the prospec-
tive will occurred.68 The instructions letter was, in Philp JA’s estimation,
‘never touched by the animus testandi of the deceased’69 and was thus not
susceptible to testamentary rescue.70
The same conclusion was reached in the South African decision of Ex Parte
Maurice71 when the court was asked to rescue a joint will that the deceased
had drafted and then sent to a colleague to ‘knock it into shape’ and there-
after to request an attorney to see to ‘finalising it in legal jargon’.72 The
deceased passed away before this could be done. Selikowitz J dismissed
the section 2(3) application, concluding that the deceased did not intend
the handwritten document to be a will, but instead regarded it as
mere instructions for the drafting of a will that he had to approve finally.73
Selikowitz J, in reaching this conclusion, reasoned that, had the South
African legislature intended to empower a court to rescue a document
that simply expresses a testator’s wishes for the distribution of his or her
estate, section 2(3) would have focussed pertinently on the deceased’s distri-
bution intentions rather than his or her testamentary intentions.74 The fact
that the legislature did not do so thus underscores, in Selikowitz J’s opinion,
the necessity of compliance with the testamentary intentions requirement,
thereby rendering instructions for the drafting of a will (being merely
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Mabika v Mabika76 – a curious South African decision on the rescue of will
drafting instructions – is patently at odds with the logical outcomes
achieved in George and Maurice. In Mabika, the deceased had completed a
document on her bank’s letterhead entitled ‘Application For the Drafting
of a Will’ that mandated the bank to prepare a will in accordance with her
instructions.77 More specifically, the deceased wrote her full name and
identification number on the form; signed the form’s terms and conditions;
and made a handwritten statement on the form regarding burial arrange-
ments and the division of property and investments amongst her children.78
It is not apparent from the judgment whether the bank indeed prepared the
deceased’s will but, if it did, the deceased died without having executed it.
The applicants – namely, the deceased’s children and grandchild – pre-
sented the completed application form to the court for condonation pur-
suant to section 2(3) of the Wills Act.79 Moshidi J granted the condonation
order.80
It is important to note that, had the condonation order not been granted,
the deceased would have died intestate and her husband (with whom she
was estranged as a result of his cruelty towards her81) would have been
one of her intestate heirs.82 In this connection, Moshidi J engaged only
superficially with section 2(3)’s requirements and instead focussed primarily
on the fact that the deceased evidently did not want her husband to
benefit upon her death and that, under the circumstances, it would be
‘greatly unjust’ not to accept the application form as the deceased’s last
will.83 In light of the foregoing, Moshidi J concluded, despite his Honour
describing the application form as merely an instruction to draft her will,84
that the deceased ‘clearly intended the document to be her final will but
did not survive to sign it’.85 This statement is, with respect, regrettably
dubious. If ‘the document’ that Moshidi J had in mind was the will that
the bank would ultimately draft pursuant to the application form, section
2(3)’s testamentary intentions requirement does not justify granting a con-
donation order in respect of the application form. If, on the other hand, ‘the
document’was the application form itself, it is difficult to conceive, in light of
decisions such as George and Maurice, how the deceased’s action of
76[2011] ZAGPJHC 109 (South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg (now forming part of the Gauteng Div-






82By operation of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 (SA), s 1(1)(c)(i).
83Mabika (n 76) [15].
84ibid [11].
85ibid [15].
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completing an application form containing instructions for the preparation
of a will exhibited the requisite animus testandi.86
It is, moreover, highly questionable for a South African judge to invoke, as
Moshidi J did,87 concepts of ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ in the abstract to resolve a
testamentary condonation application. This is because South African law does
not permit the judicial invocation of (un)reasonableness or (un)fairness as free-
standing norms in the resolution of legal disputes as to do so is to offend the
principle of legality and, accordingly, the rule of law.88 Mabika is therefore
open to criticism not only on the ground that Moshidi J paid scant regard to
section 2(3)’s testamentary intentions requirement, but also that his Honour
relied unjustifiably on considerations neither relevant nor pertinent to testa-
mentary rescue.89 The outcome inMabika should therefore have corresponded
with those in George and Maurice, and is thus atypical of judicial engagement
with will drafting instructions in the context of testamentary rescue.90
Other documents
Courts in Manitoba, British Columbia and South Africa have had to adjudicate
on the testamentary rescue of documents that, in their appearance, format
and/or general purport, resembled wills to varying degrees. These decisions
have yielded diverse outcomes and a quick survey of some of the principal
cases on point is instructive.
Decisions dealing with the rescue of formally irregular will templates are
arguably the most straightforward of these cases. For example, courts in the
two Canadian jurisdictions are generally amenable to rescuing ‘fill in the
blanks’ will templates because testators normally complete these templates
with the requisite animus testandi.91 At the time of writing, no reported
South African judgment exists in which a will template was condoned.
Courts in all three jurisdictions have, however, refused to rescue will templates
when, in a particular case, the evidence adduced was insufficient to meet the
(threshold) authenticity requirement insofar as the evidence did not show on
a balance of probabilities that the deceased in fact filled in the template in
question or that he or she did so freely and voluntarily.92
86See Michael Cameron Wood-Bodley, ‘Can Section 2(3) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 Properly Be Applied to a
Mere Instruction to Draft a Will? Mabika v Mabika’ (2013) 130(2) The South African Law Journal 244 for
criticism of this decision.
87Mabika (n 76) [15].
88Potgieter v Potgieter [2011] ZASCA 181 [31], [34]–[36].
89See further A van der Linde, ‘Longfellow v BOE Trust Ltd NO (13591/2008) [2010] ZAWCHC 117; Mabika v
Mabika [2011] ZAGPJHC 109; Taylor v Taylor [2011] ZAECPCHC 48: Requirements in Terms of Section 2(3) of
the Wills Act 7 of 1953: Some Comments on Judgments in Recent Case Law’ (2012) 45 De Jure 412, 421–22.
90Du Toit (n 13) 73–74.
91See, eg, the Manitoban decisions in Prefontaine v Arbuthnott 2001 MBQB 45,McNeil (n 34) and the British
Columbian decision in Yaremkewich Estate (Re) 2015 BCSC 1124.
92See, eg, Belser v Fleury (1999) 139 Man R (2d) 149 (MBQB); Poulk Estate 2018 BCSC 1321; Longfellow v BOE
Trust Ltd [2010] ZAWCHC 117 (Western Cape High Court, Cape Town (now forming part of HCSA-WC)).
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The same courts have furthermore rescued formally irregular handwritten
notes and letters of various kinds that expressed testamentary intentions. For
example, in Estate Beck (Re),93 the Supreme Court of British Columbia cured a
portion of a letter, written and signed by the deceased but not witnessed, as a
codicil to the deceased’s existing will.94 Similarly, in Smith v Parsons,95 the
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa condoned a handwritten suicide
note, signed and dated by the deceased but not witnessed, as an amendment
to the deceased’s existing will.96 The courts in these cases were satisfied that
the documents at issue indeed expressed the relevant deceased’s testamen-
tary intentions. Moreover, South African courts have rescued documents that
existed only in electronic format at the time of the relevant deceased’s
passing but were subsequently printed and submitted to the courts as paper
documents in condonation applications – see, for example, Macdonald v The
Master97 (where a secure computer file containing the deceased’s unsigned
will was accessed and printed in the aftermath of his suicide98) and Van der
Merwe (where an email containing the deceased’s unsigned will was printed
after his death99). As is the case with the abovementioned handwritten (albeit
signed) notes and letters, the courts in these instances were nonetheless
satisfied that the unsigned electronic documents, and hence also the printed ver-
sions thereof, indeed embodied the relevant deceased’s testamentary intentions.
South African courts have, however, refused to condone documents – even
documents drafted in a deceased’s handwriting and signed by him or her – if
not convinced on the balance of probabilities that the document(s) at issue
contained the deceased’s testamentary intentions. For example, in Taylor v
Taylor,100 a so-called ‘wish list’ regarding dealings with the deceased’s fixed
property, personal effects and the residue of his estate after his death was
not condoned, despite the fact that the deceased drafted, signed and
dated the document.101 Similarly, in Van Straaten v Ottman,102 a so-called
‘manuscript letter’ outlining the deceased’s future intentions with regard to




96ibid [13]–[14], [23]–[24]. See also Dikgale v Master of the High Court, Polokwane [2013] ZAGPPHC 85
(North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria (now forming part of HCSA-G)) [4], [24], [28] (where Teffo J con-
doned handwritten extracts from the deceased’s diary, signed by the deceased but not witnessed, as
the deceased’s last will).
972002 (5) SA 64 (O) (Orange Free State Provincial Division of the High Court (now forming part of the Free
State Division of the High Court of South Africa (HCSA-FS))).
98ibid 67H–68I, 72B–73C.
99Van der Merwe (n 47) [3], [5], [18]–[19].
100[2011] ZAECPEHC 48 (Eastern Cape High Court, Port Elizabeth (now forming part of the Eastern Cape
Division of the High Court of South Africa (HCSA-EC))).
101ibid [9]–[10], [22].
102[2015] ZAKZPHC 17 (HCSA-KZN).
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that the deceased drafted and dated the letter personally and stated her full
name, residential address and date of birth on the document.103
Evaluation
In this section of the article, two issues pertinent to testamentary rescue –
emanating from the foregoing analysis on the application of the rescue pro-
visions in the three jurisdictions under discussion – are evaluated, namely:
. the ‘document issue’: how does each of the rescue provisions engage with
digital documents for the purpose of testamentary rescue and what
improvements, if any, can be proposed in this regard?; and
. the ‘testamentary intentions issue’: how are a deceased’s testamentary
intentions in respect of a particular document established and which
legal mechanisms aid courts when they adjudicate on this issue?
The document issue
The British Columbian statute renders any ‘record, document or writing or
marking on a will or document’104 open to testamentary rescue and contains
an extensive definition of a ‘record’105 for that purpose. A plain reading of this
definition suggests that data captured in a non-paper format falls within the
ambit of the court’s testamentary rescue power. This broadened scope is simi-
larly reflected in testamentary rescue provisions in other Commonwealth jur-
isdictions,106 which is unsurprising (particularly in respect of those provisions
enacted after the turn of the twenty-first century), given the obvious need to
embrace the modern digital age by bringing data captured in formats other
than on paper into the testamentary rescue fold. This is because the
modern tendency is to move to a digital, paperless society; so much so that
even lay persons today interact to ever greater degrees with documents –
including legal documents such as wills – in a digital manner.107
103ibid [4], [39]–[41].
104WESA 2009, s 58(2).
105ibid, s 58(1).
106See, eg, in respect of Australia’s Northern Territory, the Wills Act 2000 (WA 2000), which commenced on
1 March 2001. WA 2000, s 10 provides for when the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory may, in
respect of a particular document or part thereof, ‘dispense with requirements for execution of wills’.
In this connection, WA 2000, s 10(1) defines ‘document’ as ‘a record of information’ which, in turn,
includes ‘(a) anything on which there is writing; (b) anything on which there are marks, figures,
symbols or perforations having a meaning for persons qualified to interpret them; (c) anything from
which sounds, images or writings can be reproduced with or without the aid of another thing or
device; (d) and a map, plan, drawing or photograph.’ This statutory description of ‘a record of infor-
mation’ clearly encompasses more than documents of the traditional paper variety.
107See, eg, Re Yu [2013] QSC 322 (Supreme Court of Queensland) [1], [4]–[5], [9]. In that case, the deceased
created ‘a series of documents on his iPhone’ shortly before he died, one of which ‘was expressed to be
his last Will’. An application was made for this ‘electronic document’ to be declared the deceased’s will
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It is, arguably, equally unsurprising that ‘older’ rescue provisions, such as
those contained in the Manitoban and South African wills statutes, do not
contain definitions of ‘document’ or ‘record’ such as the one found in the
British Columbian statute. These ‘older’ provisions were, of course, enacted
at times when the digitalisation of documents and records was not as perti-
nent and prevalent as is currently the case. Nevertheless, South African
courts have had to adjudicate on the rescue of documents that existed only
in electronic format at the times when the persons who prepared them
passed away. As evidenced in the case studies above, however, these docu-
ments were readily converted to paper documents by, for example, printing
out a computer file108 or an e-mail.109 Accordingly, South African scholars
have posed the question whether the South African rescue provision can,
as it currently reads, occasion a similar result in respect of, for example, elec-
tronic documents or records that cannot, for whatever reason, be converted
to hard copy format.110 Some have proffered an affirmative answer to this
question, but at the same time conceding that this is a grey area of the
South African law of wills and that a positive outcome is not guaranteed in
the event that an electronic document or record is brought before a court
for condonation.111 It is submitted that these questions and uncertainties
justify a reappraisal of ‘older’ rescue provisions with a view to including a
more contemporary approach to document creation and data capture in
the relevant statutes. It stands to reason that the British Columbian wills
statute provides invaluable guidance and direction to this end.
The testamentary intentions issue
Determining whether a document embodies a deceased’s testamentary
intentions – a requirement common to testamentary rescue in all three of
the jurisdictions under discussion – is (at least at times) particularly trouble-
some. Adjudication on this matter invariably turns on a consideration of:
the document itself; the circumstances surrounding the document’s creation;
and the (would-be) testator. Sometimes a court, having considered these
pursuant to the applicable testamentary rescue provision: Succession Act 1981 (Qld) (SA 1981), s 18. SA
1981, s 5 defines ‘document’ for the purposes of SA 1981, s 18 as the definition contained in Schedule 1
of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), which definition largely mirrors WA 2000, s 10(1) (as to which,
see n 106). Lyons J was thus satisfied that the record on the deceased’s iPhone was indeed a document
within the meaning of SA 1981, s 18 and his Honour granted an order for it to be admitted to probate.
108See text to n 98.
109See text to n 99.
110See, eg, Linda Schoeman-Malan and others, ‘Section 2(3) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953: A Retrospective and
Critical Appraisal of Some Unresolved Issues’ [2014] Acta Juridica 78, 87.
111See, eg, Michael Cameron Wood-Bodley, ‘Macdonald v The Master: Computer Files and the ‘Rescue’ Pro-
vision of the Wills Act’ (2004) 121 The South African Law Journal 34 and Michael Cameron Wood-Bodley,
‘Wills, Data Messages, and the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act’ (2004) 121 The South
African Law Journal 526.
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factors, readily and correctly finds that the testamentary intentions require-
ment has been met. For example, in Litke Estate (Re),112 the Supreme Court
of British Columbia had no difficulty in holding that a ‘will-like document’
(namely, a single piece of paper with writing on both sides signed and
dated by the deceased113) contained the deceased’s testamentary intentions
because the deceased, although of advanced age at the time, produced the
document in ‘firm, legible, well formed, and attractive’ handwriting;114
entitled the document ‘My Will and Testament’ and ‘took care to date it’;115
made specific bequests to her daughters and grandson;116 appointed the
executors of her estate;117 and made provision for gravestones for both her
and her deceased husband.118 In light of these facts, Brown J had no hesita-
tion in finding that the document represented the deceased’s testamentary
intentions and that the document, although not witnessed so as to satisfy
the formal requirements for a valid will,119 had to be fully effective as the
deceased’s will.120
Adjudication on the testamentary intentions issue is, however, often not as
straightforward as in Litke. For example, in Lane Estate,121 the Supreme Court
of British Columbia had to determine whether a series of handwritten notes
represented the deceased’s intention to alter her existing will. Pearlman J
identified certain factors that might support a finding to that effect, namely:
that the deceased used formal, will-like language in several of the notes;
signed some of the notes; informed the petitioner that she wanted him to
have her house after she died and that she had left a note to that effect;
and six of the notes contemplated a distribution of the deceased’s residuary
estate in favour of the petitioner only.122 At the same time, Pearlman J also
acknowledged that certain factors weighed against a finding that one or
more of the notes represented the deceased’s testamentary intentions,
namely: the notes were written on the back of a receipt, grocery list, calendar,
or other scrap paper (which suggested a measure of impermanence and
informality); none of the notes were witnessed (and thus all failed to satisfy
the formal requirements for a valid will); none of the notes expressly
revoked the deceased’s existing will; none of the notes bore a title
(let alone a title that suggested they were contemplated as testamentary
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may not represent an expression of the deceased’s fixed and final testamen-
tary intentions; and some of the notes were in the form of personal communi-
cations addressed to the petitioner rather than formal testamentary
documents.123 Pearlman J, having weighed all of these factors, concluded
that the notes, whether considered individually or collectively, did not, on a
balance of probabilities, represent a deliberate and final expression of the
deceased’s testamentary intentions and that the notes could thus not be
rescued.124
Lane shows that the outcome of a testamentary rescue case often turns on
whether or not the applicant can, on the evidence adduced, meet the
quantum of proof regarding the presence of the requisite intention on the
deceased’s part. The exercise of a court’s power of testamentary rescue is,
after all, ‘inevitably and intensely fact-sensitive.’125 Where, in a case such as
Lane, the facts at hand are not summarily unequivocal, the applicant (if his
or her testamentary rescue application is to be successful) must show that,
despite the presence of possible countervailing facts, the preponderance of
the evidence supports the conclusion that the document at issue indeed rep-
resents the deceased’s testamentary intentions. The petitioner in Lane failed
in this regard insofar as evidence regarding key aspects of the deceased’s tes-
tamentary intentions was lacking. This dearth of evidence and the petitioner’s
consequent inability to meet the quantum of proof ultimately determined the
outcome in Lane.126
Lane is instructive also for another reason. Pearlman J was at pains to dis-
tinguish Beck from the matter before him.127 In Beck, the deceased left instruc-
tions for the letter in question to be read out by her lawyer and she left a copy
of the letter with her executor. The court in Beck attached significant probative
weight to these actions performed prior to the deceased’s death.128 Conver-
sely, in Lane, the deceased neither showed nor provided copies of the notes in
question to anyone else before she died.129 These factual differences between
the two cases permitted Pearlman J to decide Lane without being bound by
the doctrine of precedent. Of course, had the facts in Lane resembled that of
Beck more closely, the outcome in the former case may well have been
different because Pearlman J would have had to follow the precedent set in
the latter case. Moreover, a petitioner in such a factually analogous case




125Young (n 31) [34].
126Lane (n 121) [48]–[49].
127ibid [39]–[41], [46(d)]
128Beck (n 27) [18]–[19].
129Lane (n 121) [46(d)].
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South African case law shows, however, that precedent is not necessarily
an accurate predictor of the outcome of a testamentary rescue case, in par-
ticular insofar as adjudication on the testamentary intentions issue is con-
cerned – for example, the contrasting outcomes in Van der Merwe and
Dryden v Harrison.130
In Van der Merwe, the court noted (amongst other things) that:131
. the email in question (which in its appearance resembled a will) was
entitled ‘TESTAMENT’ in large type print;
. in the email, the deceased nominated the appellant as the sole beneficiary
of his estate (apparently pursuant to an agreement between the deceased
and the appellant that each would nominate the other as sole beneficiary
of their respective estates);
. the appellant was the only beneficiary of the deceased’s pension fund;
. the appellant was the deceased’s long-time friend and confidante; and
. the appellant, having received the emailed will from the deceased, indeed
reciprocated by executing a will in which the deceased was nominated as
his sole beneficiary.
These facts led to ‘the inexorable conclusion that the document was
intended by the deceased to be his will.’132
In the subsequent decision of Dryden, the deceased sent the following
email to the applicant (his fiancée) around nine months prior to his death
with the subject line ‘Final will’:
Hi,
This serves as my final will and testament.
If I die, all my assets and investments go to Natasha Dryden. If Natasha’s death
precedes mine, the entire estate goes in equal portions to my brother and sister
or their children if their deaths proceed (sic) me.
My life policies must all g (sic) to Natasha.133
The applicant’s petition to have this email condoned as the deceased’s will
was, despite similarities with the factual matrix at hand in Van der Merwe,
unsuccessful. Nuku J was unconvinced by the facts that the email:
. explicitly identified (as did the email in Van der Merwe) its contents as being
the deceased’s last will and testament;
. designated (as was the case in Van der Merwe) the applicant as the decea-
sed’s only named beneficiary; and
130Case No. 11912/17 (HCSA-WC, 20 May 2019).
131Van der Merwe (n 47) [3], [5], [18].
132ibid [18].
133Dryden (n 130) [6].
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. awarded the deceased’s life policies to the applicant as sole beneficiary (as
happened in Van der Merwe in respect of the deceased’s pension fund pro-
ceeds).
His Honour instead regarded the email as nothing more than an assurance to
the applicant that she would eventually benefit from the deceased’s estate.134 In
fact, Nuku J distinguished Van der Merwe from the matter before him on the
ground that the deceased prepared the document at issue in Van der Merwe in
such a way that it could readily be executed (the email contained spaces for
the testator’s and witnesses’ signatures), whereas the document in Dryden ‘was
not prepared as a document intended to be signed by the deceased and the
witness.’135 Respectfully, this is a tenuous deduction based by and large on the
appearance or format of the document at hand. As discussed above, earlier
South African judgments on point have shown that the appearance or format
of the document at issue is not determinative to an assessment of the deceased’s
testamentary intentions.136 Nuku J should thus have acknowledged that the sub-
stantive factual similarities between Van der Merwe and Dryden outweigh the
lesser factual differences between the two cases to such an extent that the
sameoutcome ought have ensued. The question regarding the deceased’s testa-
mentary intentionsbeforeNuku J inDryden should thereforehavebeenanswered
with greater deference to the precedent set by a higher court in Van der Merwe.
The foregoing evaluation shows that the testamentary intentions issue
poses challenges to courts adjudicating on testamentary rescue cases in Man-
itoba, British Columbia and South Africa. It is difficult, if not impossible, to distil
‘hard-and-fast’ rules regarding such adjudication from the three jurisdictions’
rescue cases. This is undoubtedly because a rescue case, by its very nature,
deals with a fundamentally subjective question, namely the state of mind of
a person who has passed away. Answering this question involves a fact-sen-
sitive and contextually-variable judicial inquiry. Objective legal mechanisms –
in other words, mechanisms that function extraneously to the subjectivities of
a particular case – are essential aids to courts in their adjudication in rescue
cases. The foregoing evaluation of the testamentary intentions issue shows
that the quantum of proof and the doctrine of precedent, although controver-
sial in some decisions, are the principal objective legal mechanisms determi-
native to the outcomes in rescue cases.
Conclusion
This article commenced with an explanation regarding the role of testamen-
tary formalism and the functional importance of adherence to testamentary
134ibid [17].
135ibid [18].
136See text to n 95–96.
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execution formalities. It also highlighted the tension between testamentary
formalism and one of the cornerstones of the law of wills, namely effectuat-
ing testators’ dispositive plans. The testamentary rescue provisions of the
Manitoban, British Columbian and South African wills statutes seek to
diffuse this tension by allowing courts to ‘cure’, ‘dispense with’, or
‘condone’ (as applicable) non-compliance with testamentary execution for-
malities in formally irregular documents that embody the testamentary
intentions of deceased persons. In this regard, the British Columbian
rescue provision’s engagement with document creation and data capture
in a digital age suggests that its Manitoban and South African counterparts,
both of earlier origin than the British Columbian provision, require modern-
isation to bring greater legal certainty regarding which documents can be
subject to rescue applications.
Courts in all three jurisdictions readily rescue documents that are proven
to be authentic embodiments of deceased persons’ testamentary intentions.
This combination of a threshold authenticity requirement and a core testa-
mentary intentions requirement ensures that a rescued document, although
formally irregular, nevertheless conforms functionally to a duly-executed
will. The analysis of jurisprudence in this article therefore shows that
courts generally issue rescue orders only when they are satisfied that the
documents at issue, despite not complying (fully) with statutory execution
prescripts, are nevertheless aligned to, in particular, the evidentiary and cau-
tionary functions performed by testamentary execution formalities.137
Courts in all three jurisdictions under discussion will thus issue rescue
orders only if they are convinced, on a preponderance of the evidence
adduced, that a particular document contains the deceased’s volition
regarding the distribution of his or her property after death and that the
deceased indeed comprehended the significance of making the document
that purports to be a will.
Testamentary rescue cases by their very nature – and notwithstanding
the objective legal mechanisms such as the quantum of proof and the doc-
trine of precedent that aid courts in their adjudication of these cases – inevi-
tably yield some dissonant and criticisable judgments. De Waal and
Schoeman-Malan (in their assessment of the South African rescue pro-
vision) nevertheless conclude that the legislature’s aim – namely, the cre-
ation of a legal mechanism for effectuating deceased persons’
testamentary intentions – has by and large been achieved.138 This article
shows that the same holds true for the Manitoban and British Columbian
rescue provisions.
137George (n 25) [22].
138De Waal and Schoeman-Malan (n 20) 79.
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